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REPLY OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/PETITIONER
TO RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Pursuant to Rule 50(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner, Barbara J. Motes, submits the following Reply Brief to the
Defendant/Cross Appellant/Respondent's response to the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Since Major Motes' Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts makes references to
that portion of the trial court's decision relative to the Petitioner's inheritance and the manner
in which the Court of Appeals addressed that issue, the Petitioner has included in the Addendum
to this Reply Brief, a complete copy of Point I of her Petition for Rehearing related to how her
inheritance was handled by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals so that this Court can
be informed of the facts and disposition of that issue and its relationship to the issues presently

before this Court. (See also paragraphs 8, 9 & 14 of Findings of Fact and paragraphs 26, 36
& 37 of the Conclusions of Law — Addendum to Major Motes' Response.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN
Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) Petition for Rehearing
denied (Jan. 29, 1990), IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH OTHER
DECISIONS OF THE PANELS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN Fulmer
v. Fulmer. 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988) AND Martinez v. Martinez. 754
P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) cert, granted 765 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1988), AS
THOSE DOCUMENTS PERTAIN TO THE TREATMENT OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS IN UTAH DIVORCE CASES
Major Motes attempts to argue in Point I of his Response that the decision of the Court
of Appeals in Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) Petition for Rehearing denied
(Jan. 29, 1990)brings clarity to the law in Utah as it relates to the trial court's authority to
allocate income tax exemptions in divorce proceedings. Nothing could be more incorrect.
In Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 1277 (Utah App. 1988) cert, granted 765 P.2d 1272
(Utah 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in allocating the tax
exemptions between the husband and the wife and stated:
Plaintiff is entitled to the tax exemptions for all of the children in view of the
award of custody to her and the failure of defendant to establish any exception
to the general rule stated above. Id. at 72 (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, Martinez stands for the proposition that in Utah, the custodial parent is entitled
to claim the exemptions for Federal and State income tax purposes unless one of the specific
exceptions contained in the Internal Revenue Code exists. In Motes no such exception was
present.
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Martinez, supra was decided in April of 1988 and in September of 1988, the Court of
Appeals once again reaffirmed general rule of Martinez in Fulmer v. Fulmer. 761 P.2d 942
(Utah App. 1988) when Judge Billings, writing for herself and Judges Garff and Greenwood
stated:
. . . We agree with the Courts that have concluded they do not have the authority
to grant the exemption contrary to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Id. at 950
The Motes decision did not overrule either Martinez or Fulmer. However, but went on
held that trial courts in Utah now have the discretion to allocate exemptions and order one
party to execute a waiver to effectuate that allocation.
The blatant inconsistency that exists between Motes and Fulmer is obvious when the
following language from each case is compared. In Fulmer. Judge Billings, writing for the
unanimous panel stated:
Although many state courts interpreting the predecessor provisions to
section 152(e) have determined that they have discretion to award the exemption
in a divorce proceeding, see generally, Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711 717 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986) we agree with the courts that have concluded they do not have
the authority to grant the exemption contrary to the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. Id. at 718. See also Lorenz v. Lorenz. 166 Mich. App. 58. 419
N.W. 2d 770 (Mich. App. 1988V. Valento v. Valento. 385 N.W.2d 860 (Minn.
App. 1986). Id. at 950 (Emphasis on Lorenz citation added.)
Fulmer followed the rules set out in Lorenz and yet Motes which in no way overruled
either Martinez or Fulmer cited Lorenz as minority authority which was not persuasive to that
panel of Court or Appeals Judge Orme, writing for himself and Judges Billings and Greenwood
stated:
There is admittedly a split of authority on this question and a minority of
courts considering the issue have held that the 1984 amendment divests state
courts of their traditional authority to allocate dependency exemptions and that
3

state courts may not order custodial parents to execute section 152 declarations.
15 Fam. L. Rp. (BNA) 1335 (May 16, 1989). See McKenzie v. Kinsev. 532
So.2d 98, 00 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lorenz v. Lorenz. 166 Mich. App. 58,
419 N.W.2d 770. 771-72 (1988^: Gleason v. Michlitsch. 82 Or. App. 688, 728
P.2d 965, 967 (1986); Sarver v. Dathe. 439 N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (S.D. 1989);
Davis v. Fair. 707 S.W.2d 711, 717-18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). Cases following
the minority view are unpersuasive for at least two reasons. . . . Id, at 238
(Emphasis added on Lorenz citation added.)
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a Writ of Certiorari
may be granted for special and important reasons. One of the specific reasons set out in the
Rules is:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of
law. Id.
Such an inconsistency is exactly what is now before the Court therefore, Petitioner's
Writ of Certiorari on this important issue should be granted.
POINT n
MRS. MOTES WAS THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY ON APPEAL
Point II of Major Motes' response is incorrect in stating that he was also a successful
party in connection with Mrs. Motes' Appeal. To the contrary, Mrs. Motes was required to
appeal the trial court's award of the major asset of the marriage - Major Motes' military
retirement. The Court of Appeals agreed with her and reversed stating that the net effect of
the trial court's approach was:
. . . to fund defendant's support obligations through what amounts to an
appropriation of plaintiffs property. Id. at 235.
Since the major marital asset had to be reallocated, any remand would necessarily
require a reanalysis of the entire marital estate and related finances and defendant's cross
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appeal, which was meritless on its face, was not the cause of the remand. (See Order Denying
Petition for Rehearing — Addendum to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.)
To argue that he was a successful party on appeal is groundless. Likewise, to argue
that Mrs. Motes lost on appeal is spurious.
The Court of Appeals did not follow its own decisions and the decisions of this Court
in not awarding Mrs. Motes her attorney's fees on appeal when she was the successful party
on appeal and Point II of Major Motes' Response does not address that failure.
CONCLUSION
Major Motes' Response to Mrs. Motes' Petition for Writ of Certiorari is an obfuscation
and smoke screen which distracts from, rather than focuses on the issues that have been raised
by Mrs. Motes.
The Motes opinion is inconsistent with the Martinez and Fulmer opinions and fails to
follow well established law which awards attorney's fees to a successful party on appeal.
Mrs. Motes' Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted as prayed.
Respectfully submitted this /

day of May, 1990.
DART, ADAMSt)N & KASTINf

Cent M. Kastipg
Attorneys for Plaintiff/App^llant/v
Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify I caused four true and correct copies of the Petitioner's Reply to
Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be hand-delivered to the following counsel of
record on the ^7 day of May, 1990:
David S. Dolowitz
Julie A. Brian
Cohen, Rapport & Segal
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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ADDENDUM

Page
Point I, Mrs. Motes' Petition for Rehearing ~ Utah Court of Appeals ~
Denied January 29, 1990

POINT I
THIS COURT MISUNDERSTOOD HOW THE TRIAL COURT
DEALT WITH MRS. MOTES1 INHERITANCE AND ITS
DICTA RELATIVE TO ITS REMAND SHOULD BE VACATED
At the time of trial, most of Mrs. Motes1 inheritance had been
transferred bv the parties to the parties' children in accounts set
up specifically for the children (Tr. 38, 42 & 69).

Mr. Motes

claimed he was entitled to all of the appreciation on all of the
inheritance.

(Tr. 69 and Defendants Exhibit 1.)

In arriving at the overall property distribution, the trial
court isolated and did not include in it either of the parties1
retirement.

Rather, it took the remaining property and awarded

Mrs. Motes $87,707 in value and Mr. Motes $99,913 in value and then
explained that the $12,206 difference in favor of Mr. Motes was to
compensate him for his claim that his efforts increased the value
of Mrs. Motes1 inheritance (most of which had already been given
to the children).
Nowhere in the findings or record is there a suggestion that
the deferral of the retirement funds distribution was related to
and based upon the overall property distribution.

Therefore, the

dicta contained in the last paragraph of page 4 of the Motes
opinion and the further comments contained in footnote 3 reflect
a misunderstanding

of the facts by this Court

and give the

implication that an entire new trial is necessary on all of the
property issues vis a vis Mr. Motes' entitlement to compensation
for his alleged "investment services" when it is clear from the
record that the trial court considered those services.
2

The remedy

fashioned by the trial court related to the

property division was not "inextricably
court's

deferral

retirement plans.

of

a

decision

on

the

linked" to the trial
distribution

of the

At best, the retirement income deferral issue

i/as related to the trial courtfs award of child support and a
remand of this case should not, even by inference, suggest an
entire new trial on all property and support issues.

Rather, the

remand should be for the purposes of determining what child support
Kr. Motes should have been paying, after considering his actual
income and his imputed income based upon a full utilization of his
skills and talents and a determination of what he would then owe
Mrs. Motes for using all of the retirement income while this appeal
has been pending.
The mere passage of substantial amounts of time between the
trial courtfs distribution of property and this Court's decision
makes

the

suggestion

that new

trial

be

held

on

all

issues

impossible, as a practical matter, given changes in financial
positions of the parties, and fluctuations in asset values which
have occurred since trial.
The original property distribution was clearly within the
discretion of the trial court.

Simply because it did not include

two assets of the marriage (capable of now being separately divided
very easily) should not be the basis of an entire new trial as now
has been suggested in the opinion.
This Court's opinion should be modified with instructions to
the trial court to divide the pension plans consistent with this
3

App« 1988), and to then fix an appropriate award of child support
based upon the parties1 respective earnings and capacities to earn.

